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Abstract
We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power
to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set
of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action
proﬁles. We give a complete characterization of implementable proﬁles and provide
a simple method to ﬁnd them. Proﬁles implementable by bilateral commitments
are shown to be generically ineﬃcient. Surprisingly, allowing for gradualism (i.e.,
step by step commitment) does not change the set of implementable proﬁles.
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11 Introduction
Players can strengthen their position by committing themselves. This is an essential
insight of Schelling (1960). This commitment power has been analyzed as the power to
commit to a single action before the other players can move. In this paper we ask what
happens if players have the power to commit themselves but none of the players has the
privilege to do so before the other players. When players face an all or nothing decision
of commitment, i.e. players can either commit to a single action or they can choose
to stay completely ﬂexible, not much is gained. The original Nash-equilibria and some
equilibrium outcomes of the sequential version of the game arise as the only outcomes of
this sort of commitment game. To make this question an interesting question we allow
parties more ﬂexibility in terms of possible commitments. To be precise: we do not require
the players to choose to commit to a single action or to keep all of their actions for a later
decision. In our setup players are allowed to keep any closed and convex subset of their
initial action space for their choice in the second stage of the game. In a sense, players
are not so much assumed to commit to play a particular action but rather not to play
any of the actions that they ruled out. Classical examples of such commitment are ﬁrms
picking their capacity constraints, an army general burning a bridge behind his troops,
or a candidate promising not to raise taxes by more than x%. Once such commitments
are made agents still have room to choose which action they will undertake. In all these
cases, reneging on one’s commitment is either physically impossible or too costly to be
considered.1
Allowing players to commit on sets of actions can drastically aﬀect the set of equilib-
rium outcomes. The guiding question of this paper is then: which action proﬁles can be
sustained as equilibrium outcomes when we allow the agents to rule out large subsets of
actions in a commitment phase that precedes the play of the game? We give a detailed
answer to this question for the case of two player games in which action spaces and the
permissible restrictions of them are compact subintervals of the real line and in which
players have strictly quasiconcave payoﬀ functions. We embed a strategic form game G
into a two stage game in which players can restrict their action spaces in the ﬁrst stage.
In the second stage players pick actions from these restricted action spaces and payoﬀs are
determined as in the original game G. If an action proﬁle of the original game G is played
1See Muthoo (1996) for a model in which players can revoke (at some cost) their commitments.
2in the second stage of a subgame perfect strategy proﬁle we call this action proﬁle imple-
mentable by a commitment. In equilibrium, commitments become thus self-enforcing in
the sense that they are sustained by a simple sequential game structure, without assuming
punishment scheme against deviating players.
The question whether an action proﬁle is implementable by a commitment is non-
trivial. Any action proﬁle belongs to an inﬁnite set of restricted action spaces. So to
ﬁnd out whether a proﬁle x is implementable by a commitment we would have to check
whether it is implementable by any one of these inﬁnitely many pairs of restricted action
spaces. One of the main contributions of this paper is the proof that an action proﬁle
is implementable by a commitment if and only if it is implementable by what we call a
‘simple commitment.’ This reduces the complexity of our problem drastically since for
any action proﬁle there are only 4 such simple commitments.
All Nash equilibrium outcomes of the original game are implementable by a commit-
ment. Such outcomes are obtained for instance when each player commits to one single
action, his Nash equilibrium action. Another set of action proﬁles that is easily imple-
mented is ‘lead-follow’ equilibrium outcomes, that is the subgame perfect equilibrium
outcomes when we modify G such that one player is moving ﬁrst and the other follows
suit (e.g., Stackelberg in a duopoly). To implement such outcomes it suﬃces that the
‘leader’ commits to a single action (his action in the lead-follow proﬁle) and the other
player does not restrict his action space at all. This is not accidental, we show that all
action proﬁles that can be implemented by a game of commitment can be described as the
equilibrium outcome of a generalized sequential version of the game under consideration.
Important insights about following and leading in sequential games apply to the game of
strategic commitment. We use these insights to translate our characterization results into
a geometrical representation. We can show in particular that with a further restriction to
games with strategic complementarities the best reply curves alone suﬃce to characterize
all implementable proﬁles, in this case the set of implementable proﬁles is bounded by
the Nash- and follow-lead equilibrium outcomes.
Games usually have large sets of implementable proﬁles. It is our contention that this
multiplicity is a positive aspect of our theory presented in this paper. We indeed consider
that the set of implementable proﬁles adequately describes the set of proﬁles on which
two parties could agree upon in any situation in which there is a desire to cooperate (or
3coordinate) but there is lack of institutional tools to make agreements binding.We apply
our notion of bilateral commitment to the context of international tax treaties. We argue
that this interpretation is suited well for two reasons. First, it is a matter of fact that
many treaties are not point-wise agreements but rather agreements about sets of actions
each party is allowed to undertake. Recent works in the international economic litera-
ture acknowledge this aspect of treaties (Maggi and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare, 2005a,b). Second,
supranational authorities often do not have enough power to enforce punishment against
deviators, and thus a prerequisite to any treaty proposal is then to be self-enforcing.
In this respect our theory of commitment oﬀers a framework to analyze self-enforcing
treaties. Using a basic model of international tax competition we show through simple
heuristics that self-enforcing commitment permit two countries to moderate the so-called
‘race-to-the-bottom,’ i.e., equilibria with sub-optimal tax levels.
We pursue our characterization by considering a variant of our commitment game, al-
lowing parties to commit in several steps. In a recent paper, Lockwood and Thomas (2002)
indeed show that gradualism may enforce partial cooperation that is not attainable in one
step commitment. It turns out that this is not the case in our setup: a proﬁle is imple-
mentable in T rounds of commitment if and only if it is implementable in one round.
An important question is whether bilateral commitment may help players to be better
oﬀ with respect to the status quo, i.e., Nash equilibria of the original game. We show
that the players cannot, generically speaking, implement eﬃcient outcomes using commit-
ments.2 We then ask whether self-enforcing commitment can at least help to improve upon
the status quo. The answer to this question is trivial when the lead-follow equilibrium,
which are always implementable by commitment, gives both players a higher payoﬀ than
the Nash equilibria. When this is not the case, we show that no improvements are imple-
mentable in the important class of games with strategic complementarities and positive
consonance.3 However, we are able to give an example of a game with a non-monotonic
best reply curve in which parties can Pareto improve upon a unique Nash equilibrium
even though the ‘follow-lead’ equilibria do not Pareto dominate the Nash equilibrium.
Thus, we conclude on a positive note: bilateral commitments might improve the welfare
2This result parallels Dubey’s (1986) theorem that shows that Nash equilibria are generically ineﬃ-
cient.
3A game is said to have positive consonance when a player’s payoﬀ is increasing in the opponent’s
action.
4of each player.
Our results provide a new angle on the debate around endogenous timing e.g., Hamil-
ton and Slustky (1990), Amir and Grilo (1999) or Romano and Ydilrim (2005). This
literature is guided by the question: what are the equilibrium predictions of a duopoly
model if we do not arbitrarily assign the ﬁrms to move in a certain sequence? Our guiding
question is instead: what happens if we do not arbitrarily restrict the players to commit
to a single action at every moment that they are allowed to take a move? We keep a strict
order of play in our paper: in a ﬁrst stage both players are allowed to restrict their action
spaces, in s second stage they are allowed to pick actions from the restricted action spaces.
We do however allow for a lot more ﬂexibility with respect to the commitments taken by
the players. 4 Our results parallel the results in the endogenous timing literature insofar
as that we obtain that the additional ﬂexibility in the choice of commitments yields a
range of implementable proﬁles that is - in a sense to be deﬁned more precisely - bounded
by the Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes as extreme cases.
Our approach of commitment is shared by Hart and Moore (2004). The situation
they study is that of two contracting parties who can restrict the set of outcomes over
which they will bargain. One of the main diﬀerences between their work and ours is that
they assume that some uncertainty is being resolved after players committed to a set of
outcomes and before the parties bargain over the ﬁnal outcome. Without such uncertainty
there would be no reason not to commit fully in the ﬁrst period in the framework of
Moore and Hart (2004). Contrary to that no uncertainty is needed in our model to
motivate parties not to commit themselves fully in a ﬁrst period. We show that non-
trivial commitments can be Pareto-improving.
Jackson and Wilkie (2005) also allow players to modify the game to played in a pre-play
stage. Their paper is similar to ours in that they treat all players completely symmetrically
in the pre-play stage. The main diﬀerence between their work and ours lies in the set of
permissible modiﬁcations. While Jackson and Wilkie (2005) allow players to commit to
utility transfers in the second period we allow players to discard any number of actions
in the pre-play stage. These diﬀerent pre-play modiﬁcations yield diﬀerent results. Nash
equilibria can always be implemented in our framework but need not be implementable
4A notable exception in the literature on endogenous timing is Romano and Ydilrim (2005) who
assume that players commit to a lower bound.
5in theirs. On the other hand they show, like us, that pre play modiﬁcation do not
necessarily make eﬃcient outcomes implementable. Finally, Renou (2006) provides a
complete characterization of the equilibrium payoﬀs in general commitment games.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a detailed description of
the environment faced by the players, and deﬁne what we call the game of commitment.
Section 3 presents some preliminary results. We completely characterize in Section 4
the set of action proﬁles that are implementable by self-enforcing bilateral commitment.
Section 5 discusses the welfare implications of self-enforcing bilateral commitment. Most
proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
2 Games of commitment
2.1 Preliminaries
The initial situation we consider is a two-player strategic-form game G :=  N,(Yi,u i)i∈N 
with N = {1,2} the set of players, Yi the set of actions available to player i,a n dui :
Y1×Y2 → R the payoﬀ function of player i.D e n o t eY := Y1×Y2. We call the opponent of
player i,p l a y e rj. We assume that for each player i ∈{ 1,2}, Yi is a non-empty, compact,
convex subset of the real line. Without loss of generality, we take Yi =[ 0 ,1], for i ∈{ 1,2}.
For each player i, the payoﬀ function ui is assumed to be continuous in all its arguments
and strictly quasi-concave in yi, i.e., for all yj ∈ [0,1], yi ∈ [0,1], y 
i ∈ [0,1], and α ∈ (0,1),
ui(αyi +( 1− α)y 
i,y j) > min{ui(yi,y j),u i(y 
i,y j)}.5 These assumptions are met by many
economic models.
We furthermore assume that players have the ability to unilaterally commit not to
play some actions, i.e., to restrict their action sets. Such commitments are assumed to be
perfectly binding, meaning that if player i restricts his action set to Xi, any action chosen
later on must belong to Xi.
5In the words of Moulin (1984), G is a two-player ‘nice game.’ It is worth noting that the mixed
extensions of any ﬁnite games do not satisfy our assumptions. First, payoﬀ functions are not strictly
quasi-concave in such games. Second, unless the ﬁnite game has only two actions per player, mixed
action spaces are not a subset of the real line. Consequently, the theory developed in this paper cannot
be applied to mixed extensions of ﬁnite games.
6Deﬁnition 1 A (bilateral) commitment is a pair (X1,X 2)w h e r ef o rb o t hi ∈{ 1,2}, Xi
is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of [0,1].
Thus, our deﬁnition of a commitment imposes on each player a restriction of his action
space.6
Henceforth, we write the restricted action space Xi of player i as a closed real interval
[xi,xi] ⊆ [0,1], where xi (xi) refers to the minimum (maximum) of player i’s restricted
action space. Note that player i can also commit to a singleton, in which case xi = xi.
It is important to note that a commitment does not necessarily prescribe the choice
of an action. In the words of Hart and Moore (2004), “in a bilateral commitment, the
players commit not to consider actions not on the list (X1,X 2), i.e., these actions are
ruled out. Ex-post, the players are free to choose from the list of actions speciﬁed in the
commitment i.e., actions are not ruled in.”
We say that the bilateral commitment (X1,X 2) induces the game G(X): = N,(Xi,u X
i ) ,
where X = X1×X2,a n df o ri ∈{ 1,2}, uX
i (x)=ui(x) for all x ∈ X. Abusing notation, we
will drop the superscript X in the sequel. The induced game G(X)i st h u so b t a i n e df r o m
the game G by restricting the action sets of the players. We shall use the term ‘mother’t o
make reference to the original game G. For instance, we shall use the expressions mother
game, mother best-reply, mother action set, etc. Similarly, the term ‘induced’ will refer to
the best reply, action sets etc. in G(X). We denote by Yi the collection of all non-empty,
compact, convex subsets of [0,1], and deﬁne Y :=
 
i∈{1,2} Yi.
2.2 Games of commitment
Given the strategic-form game G,t h egame of commitment Γ(G) is a two-stage game
with almost perfect information, in which:
Stage 1. Both players simultaneously choose action sets Xi ∈Y i.
Stage 2. Players play the induced strategic form game G(X).
6That restrictions are assumed to be convex subsets is not without loss of generality. In particular it
ensures that the game played once players have chosen their restrictions has a Nash equilibrium. Imposing
some Lipschitz conditions is suﬃcient, however, to deal with non-convex restrictions. We also note that
imposing convex strategy sets is a common assumption in the economic literature.
7A strategy for a player i in the game Γ(G) (for short, Γ), is a pair si =( Xi,σ i)w h e r e
Xi ∈Y i,a n dσi is a mapping from Y to [0,1] such that σi(X) ∈ Xi, for all X ∈Y .
That is, a strategy for a player prescribes a choice of a restriction Xi (ﬁrst-stage action)
and, for each possible choice of a restriction for both players in the ﬁrst-stage, an action
xi ∈ Xi (second-stage action). The outcome of a strategy proﬁle s =( si)i∈{1,2} is the pair
(X,x)w h e r exi = σi(X) for each player i ∈{ 1,2}. The payoﬀs over outcomes (X,x)a r e
assumed to only depend on the action proﬁles chosen in the second stage of the game
and are given by the payoﬀs of the induced game G(X). That is, we assume that player
i derives utility ui(x)f r o mo u t c o m e( X,x). If (X,x) is the outcome of strategy proﬁle s
we call x the result of s.
The central concept of this paper is the concept of implementation by commitment,
which we now deﬁne.
Deﬁnition 2 An action proﬁle x is implementable by commitment X if the pair (X,x)
is the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of Γ.
Hence, a proﬁle x is implementable by commitment if it is a (stage 2) result of a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of Γ. In this paper, we focus on subgame-perfect equilibria
in pure strategies.
3 Games induced by commitments
We ﬁrst derive some results concerning the proper subgames of Γ, namely the set of all
induced games G(X). The proofs of the results presented below, Lemmata 1 and 2 are in
our companion paper, Bade, Haeringer and Renou (2005).
Deﬁne BRi :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1], the (mother) best-reply of player i in the game G,w i t hf o r
yj ∈ [0,1],
BRi(yj)={yi ∈ [0,1] : ui(yi,y j) ≥ ui(y
 
i,y j) for all y 
i ∈ [0,1]}.
When players commit to play in the set X,t h eb e s t - r e p l ym a pbrX
i : Xj → Xi of player
i is deﬁned similarly, bearing in mind that now player i cannot choose an action outside
Xi,t h a ti s ,f o ra l lxj ∈ Xj,
br
X
i (xj)={xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi,x j) ≥ ui(x
 
i,x j) for all x 
i ∈ Xi}.




i .T h a ti s ,br
Xi
i is the restricted best-
reply of player i when he is committed to Xi and player j can choose any action in [0,1].
Note that best-reply maps are non-empty, single valued and continuous. Furthermore,
the strict quasi-concavity of payoﬀ functions enables us to easily characterize the mapping
brX
i as a function of BRi and X.
Lemma 1 Player i’s best-reply function in G(X), brX





   
   
xi if BRi(xj) <x i ,
BRi(xj) if xi ≤ BRi(xj) ≤ xi ,
xi if xi <B R i(xj).
In words, the best-reply map brX
i of the restricted game G(X) agrees with the best-
reply map BRi of the mother game G on the set {xj ∈ Xj : BRi(xj) ∈ Xi}, and is either
xi or xi, otherwise. Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figures (1a) and (1b). In the former it
displays a mother best-reply of player j and in the latter the restricted best-reply when






















Figure 1: Mother and restricted best-replies
Denote N(G)a n dN(G(X)) the set of Nash equilibria of G and G(X), respectively.
Observe that the mother game G as well as any induced game G(X) has a Nash equilib-
rium in pure actions. Our next lemma states that if a proﬁle of actions x∗ is an equilibrium
9of G(X), but is not an equilibrium of the mother game G,t h e nx∗ ∈ bdY(X), the relative
boundary of X in Y .7
Lemma 2 If x∗ ∈ N(G(X)) \ N(G),t h e nx∗ ∈ bdY (X).
Lemma 2 states that if a commitment X∗ implements a result x∗ that is not an
equilibrium of G, then it must be the case that for at least one player, say i, the action
x∗
i is either the maximum or the minimum of X∗
i . Lemma 2 thus provides a ﬁrst intuition
about the set of implementable proﬁles. Namely, if the implemented proﬁle is not a Nash
equilibrium of the mother game G, then the action of at least one player identiﬁes with
the boundary of his restricted action space.
4 Implementation by commitments
4.1 Existence
We start by observing that the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of Γ is not, a
priori, guaranteed, for the cardinality of each player’s strategy set in Γ is uncountable. It
turns out, however, that the issue of equilibrium existence in our case is easily solved.8
Proposition 1 The game of commitment has an equilibrium.
Proof. Since Γ(G) is a ﬁnite horizon game, we can use the one-shot deviation property
to check that a proﬁle is an equilibrium —see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 103).





i(X))i∈{1,2} a Nash equilibrium of G(X) for any ﬁrst-stage actions (commitment) X.
By construction, no player can proﬁtably change his second-stage action. Observe that
since for both i ∈{ 1,2} we have y∗
i = BRi(y∗
j), neither player can obtain a strictly higher
payoﬀ than ui(y∗). Therefore, given the restriction of player i to {y∗
i},p l a y e rj cannot
increase his utility by changing his restriction on his action space. 
7Let (Y,d)b eam e t r i cs p a c ea n dX ⊂ Y .A p o i n t x is a boundary point of X in Y if each open
neighborhood U of x satisﬁes U ∩X  = ∅ and U ∩(Y \X)  = ∅. The set of all boundary points of X in Y
is bdY X. For instance, if Y =[ 0 ,1], bdY [0,1/2] = {1/2} while bdY [1/3,2/3] = {1/3,2/3}.
8See, for instance, Harris et al. (1995) for results on the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria for con-
tinuous games with almost perfect information. It is worth noting that Proposition 1 holds independently
of the number of players involved in the mother game G.
10The key observation in the proof of Proposition 1 is that any Nash equilibrium of the
mother game G is implementable. So, commitments have the power to perpetuate an
existing situation.9 Moreover, it should be noted that uniqueness is clearly not guaran-
teed. For instance, if G has a multiplicity of equilibria, then we can already construct a
multiplicity of subgame-perfect equilibria of Γ.
4.2 A Complete Characterization
We are now ready to characterize the set of all action proﬁles that can be implemented
by a commitment. The main result of this section is that if a proﬁle of actions x is
implementable, then it is implementable by one of a very small number of bilateral com-
mitments, those that we call simple.
Deﬁnition 3 A bilateral commitment X is simple if it has the form ({xi},[0,BR j(xi)])
or ({xi},[BRj(xi),1]).
In a simple commitment, one player takes an extreme position, that of excluding all
but one action. The other player, player j, truncates his action space either from below
or from above, but not both. Moreover, the truncation is at his best-reply to the only
action in player i’s extreme commitment. We are now ready to formally state the main
result of this section:
Theorem 1 An action proﬁle x∗ is implementable by a bilateral commitment if and only
if it is implementable by a simple bilateral commitment.
Before proving this characterization result, let us brieﬂy comment on the implications
of this theorem (see Section 5.5. for more on this). If we want to check whether a
particular proﬁle can be implemented by a commitment, we only need to check whether
it can be implemented by a simple commitment. This is a very manageable task, as for
any action proﬁle x∗, there are exactly 4 simple commitments that could implement it.
9In a related paper, Jackson and Wilkie (2005) propose a model in which players can commit to
utility transfers conditional on actions being played. They notably show that Nash equilibria of the
game without transfer, the mother game, might not be implementable, while they are in our paper. An
essential diﬀerence between their paper and our paper is that commitments can be undone in their paper




















It is not diﬃcult to check whether an action proﬁle can be implemented by one
of these four simple commitments. Indeed, to check whether x∗ is implementable by
({x∗
1},[0,BR 2(x∗
1)]), it suﬃces to check whether player 1 has an incentive to change his
restricted action space. Observe that in the second stage, neither player has an incentive
to deviate (player 2 will be playing the mother best-reply to player 1’s action, and player
1 does not have any choice). Furthermore, given that player 1 commits to {x∗
1},p l a y e r
2 does not have an incentive to alter his commitment, the mother best-reply to x∗
1 is
already contained in [0,BR 2(x∗
1)]). Therefore, we only need to check whether player 1 has
an incentive to deviate in the ﬁrst stage of the game. Notice that for any restriction X1
player 1 may choose the proﬁle played in the second stage must be a Nash equilibrium
of G(X1 × X∗
2). So, if player 1 chooses the restriction {x1} for some x1 ∈ [0,1], the
second stage result will be (x1,br
[0,BR2(x∗
1)]
2 (x1)). Consequently, the action proﬁle x∗ is an
equilibrium if x∗







In Section 5.5, we take this optimization program as a starting point for a geometric
characterization of implementable proﬁles.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we present the main steps leading to Theorem 1 and give intuitions for
these intermediate results. Detailed proofs can be found in the Appendix. We start by
showing a key result, namely if a result x∗ is implementable, then for at least one player
i ∈{ 1,2}, x∗
i is a mother best-reply to x∗
j.
Proposition 2 Let x∗ be implementable by some bilateral commitment X∗.T h e nx∗
i =
BRi(x∗
j) for at least one player i ∈{ 1,2}.
To see the intuition behind Proposition 2, suppose that a proﬁle x∗ is implementable by
the bilateral commitment X∗ such that neither player is using his mother best-reply. From
12Lemma 2 this means that for both players the constraints imposed by the commitment
bind. The continuity of the best replies implies that for all of player 2’s actions in a
suﬃciently small interval (x∗
2−ε,x∗
2+ε) around x∗
2, player 1’s restricted best reply remains
x∗
1. Let us now consider a diﬀerent restriction for player 2. Take a {x 
2} such that x 
2
is 1) closer to player 2’s mother best-reply to x∗
1, BR2(x∗
1), and 2) inside the interval
(x∗
2 − ε,x∗
2 + ε). (See Figure 2.) The strict quasi-concavity of player 2’s payoﬀ function
implies that the result (x∗
1,x  
2) is strictly preferred to x∗. This implies that player 2 has























Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 2
Proposition 3 Let x∗ be implementable by some bilateral commitment X∗ with x∗
j =
BRj(x∗
i).T h e nx∗ is also implementable by the bilateral commitment X , such that X 
i =
{x∗
i} and X 
j = X∗
j.
There is a tight connection between Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. By Proposition 2,
we know that in any equilibrium outcome (X∗,x ∗)o fΓ ,x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i) for at least one
player j ∈{ 1,2}. Imagine now that player i commits to the singleton {x∗
i}. Since player
j can still play BRj(x∗
i) in the second stage and there player i has no other choice but
playing x∗
i in the second stage, player j has no incentive to deviate. If player i can
13proﬁtably deviate when choosing the restriction {x∗
i}, he can also proﬁtably deviate when
choosing the restriction X∗
i . This, however, cannot be true as we started out with the
assumption the (X∗,x ∗) is an equilibrium outcome of the game.
The main insight of Proposition 3 is that if (x∗
i,BR j(x∗
i)) is implementable by a bi-
lateral commitment X∗, then it is also implementable by the commitment
X





To obtain Theorem 1, it suﬃces then to show that X∗
j can be reduced to be either [0,x ∗
j]
or [x∗
j,1]. We establish precisely that in the following proposition.





i).T h e nx∗ is also implementable by a commitment X  such that X 
i = {x∗
i}
and either X 
j =[ BRj(x∗
i),1] or X 
j =[ 0 ,BR j(x∗
i)].
Now to prove Theorem 1, take any implementable action proﬁles x∗ and let X∗ be a bi-
lateral commitment that implements it. By Proposition 3, we know that the commitment
({x∗
i},X∗
j)f o ri ∈{ 1,2} does also implement x∗. Finally, from Proposition 4, we know
that an action proﬁle that can be implemented by such a commitment can also be imple-
mented by a simple commitment. In sum, these arguments imply that an action proﬁle
can be implemented by a commitment only if it can be implemented by a simple commit-
ment. Conversely, any action proﬁle that can be implemented by a simple commitment
can be implemented by a commitment. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
4.4 Multi-period games of commitment
It is often conjectured that the lack of enforcement options may be overcome by con-
sidering gradual commitments, thus allowing to implement outcomes that could not be
attainable if players can only commit once.10 The intuition that drives this conjecture
is that in a dynamic setting players may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to make ‘small’ commitment.
Such small commitments might incentive the opponent to also commit but have the merit
to minimize the loss if the opponent does not commit. Two central contributions on
this issue are Admati and Perry (1991) and Lockwood and Thomas (2002). Admati and
10See Schelling (1956) for an early account on this issue.
14Perry (1991) consider a model in which players can make repeated voluntary contribu-
tions to ﬁnance a project. This latter is implemented only if the sum of the contribution
passes a threshold. The game stops as soon as the project is implemented. Lockwood and
Thomas (2002) consider a ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with continuous action
space in which at each stage players can only increase their level of cooperation. Both
models show that eﬃcient, or nearly eﬃcient outcomes can be obtained.11 In this section,
we follow this line of research by considering a multi-period game of commitment, denoted
ΓT.
In the game ΓT,p l a y e r sf a c eT periods of commitment and one ﬁnal stage in which
they play the game induced by their commitments. In each period t =1 ,...,T,p l a y e r s
simultaneously restrict their action spaces with the constraint that the restriction at stage
t has to be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of the restricted action space at period
t−1. That is, if Xt




in period T +1, players play the game induced by the commitment of period T, the game
G(XT).
One may imagine that allowing for several stages of commitment may change the set
of implementable proﬁles. In fact, it turns out that in our context this is not the case.
Theorem 2 For any T a proﬁle of actions x∗ is implementable in the multi-period game
of commitment ΓT(G) if and only if it is implementable in a game of commitment Γ(G).
The proof of this theorem heavily rests on a result similar to that of Proposition 2, i.e.,
if x∗ is implementable in T rounds of commitment then at least one player is best-replying.
A key observation to prove Theorem 2 is that for any equilibrium s∗ of ΓT, we can always
construct a new equilibrium proﬁle ˆ s in which players’ ﬁrst stage restrictions are the same
as their last restrictions under s∗ (on the equilibrium path), and at all other subsequent
11The models of Admati and Perry (1991) and Lockwood and Thomas (2002) do not separate as clearly
as we do the commitment decision from the decision of choosing which action to play. Their models are
simply repeated games in which the assumption that at each stage players cannot use an action ‘lower’
than their action at the previous stage. First, this implies that in their models players can only restrict
their action sets by choosing a lower bound (the contribution level in Admati and Perry (1991) or the
cooperation level in Lockwood and Thomas (2002)). Second, a key diﬀerence is that in their model, the
payoﬀ is dependent on the sequence of commitments (lower bounds), while in our model we do assume
that commitments do not enter directly the payoﬀ functions.
15stages players do not further restrict their action spaces. Hence, from the perspective of
characterizing the set of implementable proﬁles repeating the number of stages at which
players can restrict their action spaces does not enrich our model.
4.5 The geometry of implementable proﬁles
As already pointed out, Theorem 1 has remarkable implications for the characterization
of the implementable action proﬁles of a game of commitment. To check whether a proﬁle
of actions x is implementable, it suﬃces to follow a simple four-step procedure:
Step 1. Check whether x lies on the graph of the best-reply map of at least one player. If
not, then x is not implementable. If yes, go to step 2.
Step 2. Check whether x lies on the best-reply graphs of both players. If yes, then x is
implementable since it is an equilibrium of the mother game G.I fn o t ,g ot os t e p3 .
Step 3. Without loss of generality, assume that xj = BRj(xi). Construct the simple com-
mitments ({xi},[0,BR j(xi)]) and ({xi},[BRj(xi),1]). Go to step 4.
Step 4. Check whether x 
i maximizes ui(·,br
[0,BRj(xi)]
j (·)) or ui(·,br
[BRj(xi),1]
j (·)). If yes, then
x is implementable. If not, then x is not implementable.
Steps 1 and 2 are easily translated into geometric analysis. An action proﬁle can be
implemented only if it lies on the best-reply curve of at least one player. If it lies on the
best-reply curves of both players, this action proﬁle is an equilibrium of the mother game,
and from Proposition 1, it is implementable. Therefore, we are left with the question:
which of the action proﬁles that lie on only one best-reply curve can be implemented? Steps
3 and 4 give the answer. However, these last two steps do not translate as easily into
geometric analysis. In the sequel, we show that simple geometric arguments can be used to
show that certain portions of the best-reply curves of the players cannot be implemented.
Furthermore, we show that for a certain class of games, the set of implementable proﬁles
can even be completely characterized by a straightforward geometric procedure.
To get this result, we ﬁrst show that any equilibrium outcome can be described as a
two step optimization program,
16Proposition 5 An outcome (X∗,x ∗) is an equilibrium outcome of Γ(G) if and only if,












Figure 3 illustrates the logic of Proposition 5. The outcome (x∗,X∗)w i t hX∗ =
({x∗
i},[0,xj]) is an equilibrium outcome as the proﬁle of actions x∗ is associated with
player i’s highest indiﬀerence curves ICi on the section of player j restricted best-reply
curve br
[0,xj]
j that corresponds with his mother best-reply curve BRj.O b s e r v et h a tx∗ is
also implementable by the simple bilateral commitment ({x∗
i},[0,x ∗













Figure 3: The geometry of Proposition 5
Remark 1 From Proposition 5, we have that x∗ is implementable by the commitment
X∗ if x∗
i maximizes the payoﬀ of player i being on the graph of the restricted best-reply
of player j. This result has thus the ﬂavor of the outcome of a sequential game in which
player i moves ﬁrst. Intuitively, this is not surprising since, as already pointed out by
17Schelling (1960), the power to commit oneself is equivalent to a ﬁrst move.12 Hence,
implementable proﬁles of actions have a Stackelberg-type structure, one player ‘leads’ the
commitment while the other ‘follows.’
We now provide a geometric condition that has to hold for a proﬁle of actions to be
implementable. In other words, if this condition does not hold at a proﬁle of actions
x∗ with x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i), then x∗ is not implementable; it does not solve the above maxi-
mization program. For simplicity, assume that the (mother) best-reply maps and payoﬀ
functions are continuously diﬀerentiable.13 The geometric condition relates the slope of
the indiﬀerence curve of player i at x∗ with the slope of the best-reply of player j at the
same action proﬁle x∗.
Proposition 6 Let x∗ be an implementable proﬁle of actions with x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i),a n dx∗
interior. It cannot be true that the slope of player i’s indiﬀerence curve at x∗ is strictly
negative (resp., positive) while the slope of player j’s (mother) best-reply at x∗ is positive
(resp., negative).
Proposition 6 thus provides a general geometric condition for implementability: the
slope of player i’s indiﬀerence curve and the slope of player j’s best-reply must have the
same sign. For instance, in Figure 4, x∗ is not implementable since BRj is positively
sloped at x∗ while player i’s indiﬀerence curve ICi is negatively sloped. Hence, to look
for implementable action proﬁles, we can restrict our attention to the proﬁles that are
on the positively (resp., negatively) sloped portions of the best-reply curve of player j in
the positive (resp., negative) indiﬀerence curve section of player i. This condition is not
12There is now an abundant literature on imperfect competition whose purpose is to obtain Cournot
and Stackelberg outcomes as equilibrium outcomes of the same model. Interestingly, several models use
an approach similar to ours: they give the possibility to the ﬁrms to commit to some actions —see
for instance Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , van Damme and Hurkens (1999) or more recently Romano
and Yildirim (2005), and the references therein. More precisely, ﬁrms in most of these models are
assumed to commit either to a single action or to not commit at all. A notable exception is Romano and
Yildirim (2005) who assume that ﬁrms can restrict their action sets only from the bottom, i.e., ﬁrms can
only accumulate. Hence these models can be seen as a simpliﬁed version of our approach. Hamilton and
Slutsky’s main result is that the only equilibrium result that can be obtained are the Cournot and the
Stackelberg outcomes, while our approach allows for a larger set of equilibrium results.















Figure 4: The proﬁle x∗ is not implementable.
suﬃcient, however. In what follows, we give a necessary and suﬃcient geometric condition
for implementation in an important class of mother games.
Consider the class of games with strategic complementarities.14 Furthermore, we as-
sume that the function ui(·,BR j(·)) is strictly quasi-concave in xi, for all i ∈{ 1,2}.15
For simplicity, we also assume that player i’s payoﬀ is increasing in player j’s action xj
for all i ∈{ 1,2}, that is, the game has positive consonance.16 We show that for this
class of games, the knowledge of the Nash equilibria of G along with the knowledge of
the ‘lead-follow’ proﬁles is necessary and suﬃcient to completely characterize the set of
implementable proﬁles of actions.
First, we need to order the set of Nash equilibria of G. Deﬁne x∗(1) the Nash equi-
librium of G with the lowest coordinate for player i, that is, there does not exist another
equilibrium x of G such that xi <x ∗
i(1). Similarly, deﬁne x∗(2) the equilibrium of G
14See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 490) for a deﬁnition. It is worth noting that a similar charac-
terization holds for games with strategic substitutabilities.
15See Romano and Yildirim (2005) for similar assumptions.
16This assumption is not crucial. A complete characterization without this assumption is available
upon request.
19with the second lowest coordinate for player i, and so on recursively.17 Note that since
best-reply maps are single-valued, x∗(k) is a singleton for any k>0. Moreover, the set of
equilibria of G is generically ﬁnite and odd (see Harsanyi (1973)), hence there generically
exists a ﬁnite odd number K of x∗(k)’s. (See Figure 5.)
Second, deﬁne (li,BR j(li)) the proﬁle of actions such that li maximizes ui(·,BR j(·)),
that is, the proﬁle of actions (li,BR j(li)) is the lead-follow proﬁle with player i as the
leader. It is worth noting that since ui(·,BR i(·)) is strictly quasi-concave in xi and BRj
single-valued, li is unique. Moreover, since BRi and ui are non-decreasing functions of
xj,w eh a v et h a tli ≥ x∗
i(K) for all i ∈{ 1,2} (See Lemma A3 in the Appendix). Our next
proposition states that the knowledge of li and the x∗(k)’s is necessary and suﬃcient to
completely characterize the set of implementable proﬁles of actions.
Before stating the proposition, let us introduce a last piece of notation. Deﬁne Ii as a









i(k +1 ) ]∪ [x
∗
i(K),l i]. (3)
Observe that the set Ii is uniquely deﬁned by the knowledge of li and the x∗(k)’s.
Proposition 7 Consider a game with strategic complementarities and positive conso-
nance. The set of implementable proﬁles of actions is I = I1 ∪I 2 with for i ∈{ 1,2},
j  = i:
Ii = {x : xj = BRj(xi),x i ∈ Ii}.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is rather simple. First, note that since G is a
game with strategic complementarities, the best-reply maps are increasing. Moreover,
the best-reply map of any player, BRi, separates the action space [0,1]2 into two regions
{x : xi <B R i(xj)} where player i’s indiﬀerence curves are negatively sloped, and {x :
xi >B R i(xj)} where player i’s indiﬀerence curves are positively sloped. Second, for
any x with xj = BRj(xi)a n dxi ∈ (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k + 1)), k even, we have xi <B R i(xj),
17Formally, let x∗(0) = ∅, and deﬁne for any k>0,
x∗(k): ={x ∈ N(G) \∪
k−1
k =0{x∗(k )} : xi ≤ x 
i, ∀x  ∈ N(G) \∪
k−1
k =0{x∗(k )}}.
20hence player i’s indiﬀerence curve is negatively sloped at x.S i n c e BRj is positively
sloped, it follows from Proposition 6 that x is not implementable. A similar argument
holds for any x with xj = BRj(xi)a n dxi <x ∗
i(1). Finally, any proﬁle of actions x
with xj = BRj(xi)a n dxi ∈ (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k + 1)), k odd, is implementable by the simple




i)i sBRj(xj)f o rx 
i >x i,a n dBRj(x 
i), otherwise. The strict
quasi-concavity of ui and ui(·,BR j(·)) implies then that xi is solution of the optimization















Figure 5: The set of implementable proﬁles (in bold)
For the class of games with monotonic best-reply maps and ui(·,BR j(·)) strictly quasi-
concave in xi, the complete characterization of the set of implementable actions is therefore
purely geometric, and the only knowledge required is that of the Nash equilibria of G and
the lead-follow proﬁles.
4.6 Bilateral tax treaties as an example
Consider a basic tax competition model between two countries, 1 and 2, where govern-
ments compete for a (perfectly) mobile capital. Both economies produce a private good
21produced using labor (which is immobile) and a public good, whose production is ﬁnanced
by a tax ti on capital levied by each government i ∈{ 1,2}. Governments are social welfare
maximizers, i.e., they maximize the utility of a representative consumer (which depends
on consumption of both private and capital goods). If one country raises its tax rate,
the capital owners will respond with a reallocation of capital such that after tax revenue
from capital is equal in both countries. Best replies in such a model are upward sloping, a
higher tax rate in the foreign country means that the reallocation eﬀect from a raise of the
tax rate in the home country will be less pronounced. The received wisdom for this type
of model is that competition between governments will result in a so-called ‘race to the
bottom.’ To see this, notice that whenever the gains obtained by having a higher share of
the world capital stock oﬀset the losses due to a lower tax rate, both countries will have
an incentive to have a lower tax rate than that of the opponent. However, higher tax rates
for both governments mean higher revenues for both governments. So, in equilibrium tax
rates are sub-optimally low, resulting in an ineﬃcient level of public good provision.18
A nice interpretation of a commitment in this context is that of a treaty. The story
we have in mind is as follows. Consider that the two countries negotiate over the terms
of a tax treaty. However, in order for a treaty to come into force, it has to be ratiﬁed
by the parliament of each country. We have then in mind situations in which a treaty
won’t be ratiﬁed by country A if the limitations that the treaty imposes on country A
are not a best-reply to the limitations that the treaty imposes on the other country.We
interpret the translation of the requirements of the treaty into national law as a binding
commitment. This binding commitment does not necessarily specify a particular tax
proﬁle but intervals of tax levels (i.e., the ﬁrst-stage restrictions), and each country has
in turn discretion to choose a particular tax level that ﬁts in the interval speciﬁed by the
treaty. Viewing treaties as commitment on intervals rather than point-wise commitments
is a approach in line with recent literature on international economics —see Maggi and
Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2005a,b).19
Figure 6 describes the best-replies of each country and the set of implementable proﬁles
for a rudimentary version of the tax competition model we just presented. Note that in
18See Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1999).
19Committing on intervals rather than on a particular value is often employed in environmental treaties.
For instance, article 3 of the Kyoto protocol stipulates that countries are bound to reduce their overall
emissions of greenhouse gases by 2008-2012 by ‘at least’ 5% (on average) below the 1990 levels.
22such models there is a second mover’s advantage in the sense that if countries where to
choose their tax rates sequentially both countries would prefer to choose second. This is
so because once the opponent has set its tax rate a country can set a set a tax rate a
bit lower in order to attract a higher share of the capital stock. In Figure 6 we deﬁne
l(i)b yl(i)=( li,BR j(li)). So, the payoﬀ of either player is monotone increasing from
the Nash equilibrium B to either of the lead-follow proﬁles, l(1) or l(2). Note that the












Figure 6: A simple model of tax competition.
We can then use our characterization results to identify the set of implementable
proﬁles in this simple model. First, notice that the strict quasi-concavity of the payoﬀ
function implies that all proﬁles that are in the segment [A,B] are such that ﬁrm 1’s
indiﬀerence curve is downward slopping. Thus, using Proposition 6 we deduce that these
proﬁles are not implementable. To complete the characterization of implementable pro-
ﬁles, we can use Proposition 7. Implementable proﬁles are depicted by the bold segments
[B,l(1)] ∪ [B,l(2)].
Can a treaty make both countries better oﬀ? Without the treaty the payoﬀs of both
countries are determined by the Nash equilibrium outcome. It turns out that in this
example all the proﬁles that are implementable by a commitment (or treaty in this con-
text) Pareto dominate the Nash equilibrium, but none of these outcomes is eﬃcient.20
Furthermore each outcome that is implementable by a treaty is Pareto dominated by at
20This contrasts with Rodr´ ıguez-Clare and Maggi (2005a,2005b) who start with the assumption that
treaties are eﬃcient.
23least one of the lead-follow equilibria l(1) and l(2). In our next section on the social value
of commitments we show that these features are quite general. We ﬁrst show that im-
plementable proﬁles are generically not eﬃcient. We show next that any implementable
proﬁle is dominated by a lead-follow equilibrium in a game with strategic complemen-
tarities. Finally we show that the case for commitments by action space restrictions is
strongest in games with non-monotonous best replies. In the context of tax treaties this
means that they have the most appeal in a context in which the reallocation of capital is
governed by a non-monotonic best reply curve. This is most likely to happen when there
are exogenous obstacles to capital movements.
5 The Social Value of Commitments
If we interpret our commitment game as a mechanism to implement a particular action
proﬁles we should ask: Why don’t players simply commit to eﬃcient proﬁle of actions? It
turns out that quite generally such commitments are not self-enforcing. More precisely,
we show that if G is a smooth game, then we have generic ineﬃciency.
Next, we address the question whether commitments are at least useful to implement
action proﬁles that Pareto dominate the Nash equilibria of the mother game. We conclude,
on a more positive note: we show that commitments can very well serve to make both
players better oﬀ if certain conditions are met.
5.1 Eﬃciency
Let us ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of eﬃciency.
Deﬁnition 4 A proﬁle of actions y is eﬃcient if there does not exist another proﬁle of
actions y  such that ui(y ) ≥ ui(y) for all i ∈{ 1,2},a n dui(y ) >u i(y)f o rs o m ei ∈{ 1,2}.
Deﬁnition 4 is the textbook deﬁnition of (Pareto) eﬃciency. It is worth noting that
several related papers e.g., Jackson and Wilkie (2005) or Gomez and Jehiel (2005), use
a stronger concept of eﬃciency: a proﬁle of actions is eﬃcient if it maximizes the sum
of players’ payoﬀs. However, since we do not necessarily assume transferable utilities,
our concept of eﬃciency is more appropriate. Let us now turn to the concept of smooth
games.
24Deﬁnition 5 The game G is a smooth game if for all i ∈ N, ui is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable.
Two remarks are in order. First, in virtually all economic models in which payoﬀ
functions are assumed to be continuous, payoﬀ functions are also assumed to be twice
continuously diﬀerentiable.21 For instance, linear-quadratic Cournot games or models of
Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated goods are smooth games. Second, we actually
need the assumption of diﬀerentiability only around equilibrium results.
Theorem 3 For any smooth game G, interior equilibrium results of the commitment
game Γ(G) are generically ineﬃcient.22
This result is reminiscent of Theorem 1 of Dubey (1986), which states that Nash
equilibria of smooth games are generically ineﬃcient. The main reason for hope that this
result could be overcome in the game of commitments is that the set of action proﬁles
that can be implemented is (in general a large) superset of the set of Nash equilibria of
the mother game. So, there is hope that this superset would also contain some eﬃcient
proﬁles. However, our Theorem 3 shows that this does not hold true, just like Nash
equilibria of smooth games, the proﬁles that are implementable by commitments are
generically ineﬃcient.
Not only is our Theorem 3 reminiscent of Dubey (1986), also the proof follows along
similar lines. The main diﬀerence (and diﬃculty) we face is that implementable proﬁles
that are not themselves Nash equilibria of the mother game lie on the boundary of the
action space of the subgame G(X)w i t hX the commitment that is implementing the
proﬁle (Lemma 2). This implies that diﬀerentiability of the restricted best response fails
precisely where we need it: at the action proﬁle under investigation.
Some additional remarks are in order. First, allowing for commitment to transfer
utilities conditional on actions being played, Jackson and Wilkie (2005) also show that
eﬃciency might not hold for two-player games. Whether eﬃciency holds if we allow for
commitments to transfer functions and actions is an open question. Second, Theorem 3
21Moreover, any continuous function can be arbitrarily approximated by continuously diﬀerentiable
functions by Weierstrass Approximation Theorem —See Zeidler (1986, p. 770).
22Let T be a set of parameters indexing the payoﬀ functions i.e., for each player i ∈{ 1,2}, ui : X×T →
R. By genericity, we mean that there exists an open, dense subset of T for which any equilibrium result
is ineﬃcient.
25continues to hold if G is a game with strategic complementarities, but not necessarily
smooth. (See Appendix.) Third, eﬃcient proﬁles on the boundary can in some games be
implemented by commitments. This holds in particular if a game has an eﬃcient Nash
equilibrium on the boundary.
5.2 Pareto Improvements
While eﬃcient results are generically not implementable, a self-enforcing commitment
might nonetheless implement an improvement upon the status quo. In other words, the
next question we address is whether a commitment can implement a proﬁle that makes
both players better oﬀ compared to any equilibrium of the mother game G.
Deﬁnition 6 Ar e s u l tx∗ is an improvement upon the status quo if ui(x∗) ≥ ui(y∗) for all
i ∈{ 1,2},a n dui(x∗) >u i(y∗) for at least one player, where y∗ is an action proﬁle that is
eﬃcient in the set of mother Nash equilibria.23
It is not hard to ﬁnd games in which improvements upon the status quo can be
implemented. Just take any game with a unique Nash equilibrium y∗ and a lead-follow
equilibrium that dominates y∗.24 The lead-follow equilibrium can be implemented by
the commitment in which the leader restricts his action space to a singleton while the
follower does not restrict his action space at all. So the more interesting question is: can
commitments be used to implement improvements upon the status quo if none of the
lead-follow equilibria represents such an improvement? In our next result we show that
this cannot happen if the players’ best responses are monotone and if the players’ utilities
are monotone in the actions of the opponent. We say that a game satisﬁes constant
consonance if any players payoﬀ is monotone in the action of the other player.
Theorem 4 Let G be a game with constant consonance such that the lead-follow equilibria
do not improve on the status quo. Then there exists an equilibrium improvement x∗ only
if at least one best-reply map is non-monotonic.
23Note that the set of equilibria N(G) is a compact set, hence eﬃciency is well deﬁned.
24This is the case for instance of any game with a strict second-mover advantage (e.g., diﬀerentiated
Bertrand duopoly). Since the payoﬀ of the ﬁrst mover in a lead-follow proﬁle is necessarily weakly higher
than the highest Nash equilibrium, the former Pareto dominates the latter.
26An important implication of Theorem 4 is that if G, in addition to be a game with
constant consonance is also a game with strategic complementarities or strategic sub-
stitutabilities, then commitments do only serve to improve upon the status quo if the
lead-follow equilibrium is already itself such an improvement. This result sharply con-
trasts with Proposition 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1989), and illustrates how seemingly
innocuous restrictions on the set of feasible commitments can be critical. Bernheim and
Whinston’s model and our model, albeit similar in spirit, diﬀer in two important dimen-
sions. First, in their model only one player (the principal) has the opportunity to commit.
Second, and more importantly, the principal does not only have the power to commit him-
self (to take a single action) but he can also restrict the action set of the other player, the
agent. This contrasts with our model in which both players have the power to commit
and a player can only restrict his own action set.
Theorems 3 and 4 are rather negative results in that the power of commitment does
not seem to be of much social value. The following example shows that equilibrium
improvements do exist even in the case that neither of the lead-follow equilibria represents
such an improvement.

























y2 if y2 ≤ 1,
















0o t h e r w i s e .
The mother game has a unique equilibrium, y∗
1 =4 /3(
√
3 − 1), y∗
2 =2 /3(2 −
√
3),
with equilibrium payoﬀs of ui(y∗)=4 /3, uj(y∗)=8 0 /3(1 −
√
3)  − 19.52, respec-
27tively. Moreover, the lead-follow proﬁle (BR1(l2),l 2)=( 1 ,0) is associated to payoﬀs of
u1((BR1(l2),l 2))) = 0,u 2((BR1(l2),l 2)) = −1/9  − 0.11.
Let us show that there exists a self-enforcing commitment which implements the action
proﬁle ˜ y =( 8 /9,1/9) with associated payoﬀs of u1(˜ y)=1 6 /9a n du2(˜ y)=−1441/81  
−17.79, respectively. Clearly, both players’ payoﬀs improve upon the Nash equilibrium.
According to Proposition 2, at least one player’s action must be a best-reply against the
action of the other player. In the proﬁle ˜ y,w eh a v e8 /9=BR1(1/9).
Following Proposition 4, we can focus, without loss of generality, on only two candi-
dates for the restriction of player 1, [0,8/9] or [8/9,1]. We claim that player 1’s restriction
cannot be [0,8/9]. To see this, observe that if 1 commits to [0,8/9], then player 2 can
commit to {1} and gets a payoﬀ of −1/9( s i n c ebr
[0,8/9]
1 (1) = 0), which is higher than
u2(˜ y). Therefore, the unique candidate for 1’s restriction is [8/9,1]. In this case, player
1’s restricted best-reply is
br1(y2)=m a x{−4y2 +4
√
y2,8/9}. (4)
Observe that for all y2 ∈ [1/9,4/9], we have −4y2+4
√
y2 ≥ 8/9. It follows that 2’s payoﬀ
when y2 / ∈ [1/9,4/9] is −(y2 − 2/9)2 − 160/9, which is maximized when y2 =1 /9. If
y2 ∈ [1/9,4/9], then player 2 maximizes u2(y)=−4y2 +4
√
y2. That the maximum is




Proof of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let s∗ =( X∗
i ,σ ∗
i )i∈{1,2}
be an equilibrium of Γ, and suppose that (X∗,x ∗) the outcome of s∗ is such that x∗
i  =
BRi(x∗
j) for all i ∈{ 1,2}, i  = j. To reach a contradiction, we ﬁrst identify an action, x 
1







2. Second, we show that there exists
a strategy for player 1, s 
1, such that the outcome of (s 
1,s ∗
2)i s( X∗,(x 
1,x ∗
2)), hence a
contradiction with s∗ being an equilibrium.




for all i ∈{ 1,2}, i  = j. Suppose that brX∗
i (x∗
j)  = BRi(x∗
j) for all i ∈{ 1,2}, i  = j.
By continuity of BR2 and br
X∗
2
2 (remember that brX∗





there exists an open interval (x∗
1 −ε,x∗
1 +ε)w i t hε>0 suﬃciently small such that for all
x1 ∈ (x∗
1 − ε,x∗




2.N e x tp i c kα ∈ [0,1) large enough such
that x 
1 = αx∗
1 +( 1− α)BR1(x∗
2) ∈ (x∗
1 − ε,x∗
1 + ε). By construction of (x∗
1 − ε,x∗
1 + ε),









2) since player 1’s payoﬀ
function is strictly quasi-concave in x1.
Step 2. We claim that the strategy s 
1 =( {x 
1},σ ∗
1) is a proﬁtable deviation for player
1. The outcome of (s 
1,s ∗




2)), which, by construction, gives a strictly
higher payoﬀ to player 1.




2)) be an equilibrium of Γ with
outcome (X∗,x ∗). By Proposition 2, for at least one player, say player 1, we have x∗
1 =
BR1(x∗
2). We claim that the strategy proﬁle s  := (s∗
1,s  
2), with s 
2 =( {x∗
2},σ ∗
2), is also an
equilibrium of Γ, with outcome ((X∗
1,{x∗
2}),x ∗).
First, observe that player 1 does not have an incentive to deviate from s∗
1 given player
2’s strategy s 
2. Indeed, since player 2’s restriction is the singleton {x∗
2}, player 1 cannot
obtain a payoﬀ higher than u1(BR1(x∗
2),x ∗
2), which is the payoﬀ he obtains under s .
Second, to show that player 2 has no proﬁtable deviation, we use the one shot deviation
property. Since s  agrees with s∗ in all proper subgames of Γ, and s∗ is an equilibrium of
Γ, player 2 has no proﬁtable deviations in any of the proper subgames of Γ.
29Suppose now that s  
2 =( X  
2,σ ∗
2) was a proﬁtable deviation for player 2 given player
1’ strategy s∗
1. Since player 2 is indiﬀerent between (s∗
1,s  
2)a n ds∗, it follows that s  
2 is
also a proﬁtable deviation from s∗
2, a contradiction with our assumption that s∗ is an
equilibrium.




j)) be an equilibrium of Γ with
result x∗, X∗
j =[ xj,xj], and x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i). Deﬁne s 
j =( [ x∗
j,1],σ ∗
j)a n ds  
j =( [ 0 ,x ∗
j],σ ∗
j).
We claim that either (s∗
i,s  
j)o r( s∗
i,s   
j) is an equilibrium of Γ with result x∗.F i r s t ,o b s e r v e
that both strategy proﬁles under consideration have x∗ as their result. To see this, note
that player i has only one action x∗
i, and player j’s mother best response to x∗
i, BRj(x∗
i),
is contained in his restricted action space in either case. Second, note that player j does
not have an incentive to change his restricted action space given player i’s commitment to
{x∗
i} as his restricted action space contains his mother best-reply BRj(x∗
i) to the single
action in player 1’s restricted action space .
It remains to show that player i has no proﬁtable deviation from his commitment to
{x∗
i} given the commitment of player j to either [x∗
j,1] or [0,x ∗
j]. Since s∗ is an equilibrium
of Γ, the set of action proﬁles that give player i a payoﬀ strictly higher than ui(x∗),
{x : ui(x) >u i(x∗)}, does not intersect the graph of the restricted best-reply br
[xj,xj]
j of
player j. For otherwise, player i would have a strictly proﬁtable deviation from s∗
1.I t















j < 0. (A2)
We can also observe that for all xi ∈ [0,1],
br
[xj,xj]
j (xi) ≤ br
[x∗
j,xj]






j (xi) ≥ br
[xj,x∗
j]














30This implies that given the commitment of player j to [x∗
j,1], player i cannot obtain a





j) is an equilibrium of Γ. If (A1) does not hold, then (A2) must




Proof of Proposition 5. Observe that we can rewrite conditions (i) and (ii) as follows.
Ap r o ﬁ l ex∗ is implementable by a bilateral commitment if and only if there exists a
restriction X∗
j such that x∗
i is a solution of the following program,

   





















with respect to xi. This is the program (P). Second, we check whether the solution
obtained lies on the graph of j’s best-reply BRj.
(⇒ )L e t s∗ =( Xi,σ ∗
i)i∈{1,2} be an equilibrium of Γ, where X∗
1 = {x∗
1}.( T h e
case when X∗
2 = {x∗
2} is symmetric). Note that we make use of Proposition 3. For all
X ∈Y , the mappings σ∗
1 and σ∗
2 are such that (σ∗
1(X),σ ∗
2(X)) is a Nash equilibrium




Thus, for all deviations by player 1 to a strategy s1 =( {x1},σ ∗





2 (x1)). Moreover, any deviation by player 1 to a strategy
s 
1 =( X 
1,σ ∗
1)f o rs o m eX1 ∈Y 1 with result x is result-equivalent to a deviation of the
type s1 =( {x1},σ ∗
1)s i n c ex2 = br
X∗
2
2 (x1) for both proﬁles of strategies. Since s∗ is an











2 (x1)), ∀ x1 ∈ Y1 .
That is, x∗
1 must be a solution of (P). By Proposition 2, we have x∗
i = BRi(x∗
j) for at
least one player i ∈{ 1,2}. Suppose that x∗
2  = BR2(x∗
1). Then, given ({x∗
1},σ ∗
1), player 2
is better-oﬀ deviating to ({BR2(x∗
1)},σ ∗
2), a contradiction with s∗ being an equilibrium.
Hence, we have x∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1), and therefore, x∗
1 is solution of (P∗).
31(⇐ ) Suppose that x∗







2), where the mappings σ∗
1 and σ∗
2 are such that (σ∗
1(X),σ ∗
2(X))
is a Nash equilibrium of G(X), for all X ∈Y . Clearly, the outcome of s∗ is (x∗
1,x ∗
2),
and by construction it is a Nash equilibrium of G({x∗
1}×X∗
2).25 By construction, for
all subgames G(X), the actions (σ∗
1(X),σ ∗
2(X)) constitute a Nash equilibrium of G(X).
Hence, according to the one-shot deviation property, it suﬃces to check that there is no





1}, player 2 cannot obtain a better payoﬀ than u2(x∗), and thus has no
proﬁtable deviation. As for player 1, suppose that there exists X1 ∈Y 1 such that for




2). Let ˜ x be the outcome of the proﬁle (s1,s ∗
2). Since s1
is a proﬁtable deviation, we then have u1(˜ x) >u 1(x∗). By construction of the mapping
σ2,w eh a v e˜ x2 = br
X∗
2
2 (˜ x1), a contradiction with the fact that x∗
1 is a solution of (P).
B Proofs related to the multi-period game of commitments, ΓT
Lemma A1 Let x∗ ∈ N(G). The proﬁle x∗ is implementable in ΓT(G).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1, and left to the reader. 
Lemma A2 Let x∗ be implementable in ΓT(G). We have x∗
i = BRi(x∗
j) for at least one
player i ∈{ 1,2}.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that x∗ is implementable in
ΓT(G) by the strategy proﬁle s∗, but x∗
i  = BRi(x∗
j) for all players i ∈{ 1,2}. Assume that
x∗
i >B R i(x∗




where ht is the history at period t on the equilibrium path. From Lemma 1 in the main
t e x t ,w eh a v et h a tx∗
i = xT
i for both players. Let ht∗ be the last history on the equilibrium
path of s∗ such that x
t∗
i
i  = xT
i for at least one player i ∈{ 1,2}. Such an history exists
as the empty history (i.e., the beginning of the game) satisﬁes this inequality. Without
loss of generality, assume xt∗
1  = xT







2 for any t ≥ t∗ + 1. We now show that player
25Since x∗







2. Moreover, single-valuedness of BR2 implies





321 has a proﬁtable deviation at history ht∗





1  = ∅ suﬃciently close to x∗










2 is the restriction played by player 2 at history ht∗
under s∗





















1)) = (x 
1,x ∗
2). Strict quasi-
concavity of u1 thus implies that s 
1 is a proﬁtable deviation for player 1, a contradiction.

Proof of Theorem 2. (⇐). The proof is trivial if T = 1. Suppose that T ≥ 2.
Let x∗ be an action proﬁle implementable in Γ(G) by the simple bilateral commitment




1). We now show that we can
implement x∗ in ΓT(G). To this end, consider the strategies in ΓT(G) such that player
1 chooses the restriction {x∗
1} in the ﬁrst stage (and, hence in all subsequent stages)
and player 2 restricts to X∗
2 at the initial history and at all subsequent histories ht of





2 at the initial history h0, and for any history ht =( h0,({x∗
1}×X∗





2. Clearly, any proﬁle satisfying this requirement
yields the result x∗.S i n c ex∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1), and given that player 1 restricts to the singleton
{x∗
1}, player 2 has no incentive to deviate. As for player 1, observe that he can only deviate
at the ﬁrst stage. Consider a ﬁrst-stage deviation by player 1 to X1. The induced game is
ΓT−1(G(X1×X∗
2)), and let x  be a Nash equilibrium of G(X1×X∗
2). By Lemma A1, there
exists a proﬁle of strategies s∗|X1×X∗
2 such that x  is implementable in ΓT−1(G(X1×X∗
2)),
with s∗|X1×X∗
2 a proﬁle of strategies following the history (h0,(X1×X∗
2)). (More precisely,
let s be any proﬁle of strategies of ΓT, s|h is the proﬁle of strategies induced by s after
history h i.e., si| 
h = si(h,h ) for any h  in the set of histories following history h.) Note that
since x  is the Nash equilibrium of G(X1 × X∗







1 ∈ argmaxx1∈Y1 u1(x1,br
X∗
2
2 (x1)), we have u1(x∗) ≥ u1(x ). It follows that the
strategies in which player 1 commits to {x∗
1} in the ﬁrst stage, player 2 commits to X∗
2 at
the initial history and at all subsequent histories ht of length t<T,p l a y e r sp l a ys∗|X1×X∗
2
following any ﬁrst-stage deviation of player 1 implements x∗. (To be complete, assume
that the strategies prescribe the play of an equilibrium after any other type of histories.)
33(⇒). Let s∗ be a subgame perfect equilibrium of ΓT(G) that implements the proﬁle x∗,
and denote (X1
1,X1
2) the restriction played in the ﬁrst stage of ΓT(G). From Lemma A2,
it follows that x∗
i = BRi(x∗
j) for at least one player i ∈{ 1,2}. W.l.o.g., suppose that
x∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1). We claim that the commitment ({x∗
1},X1
2) implements x∗ in Γ(G). Player
2 has clearly no incentive to deviate given the commitment of player 1 to {x∗
1}.C o n s i d e r
now player 1, and suppose that player 1 has a proﬁtable deviation X 
1 from his commitment
{x∗
1}. Following player 1’s deviation, the induced game is G(X 
1×X1
2), and let x  be a Nash
equilibrium of G(X 
1 × X1
2)w i t hu1(x ) >u 1(x∗). (Note that we implicitly consider the
proﬁle of strategies ((X 
1,σ 1)(X1
2,σ 2)) with (σ1(X),σ 2(X)) a Nash equilibrium of G(X)





1)s i n c ex  is a Nash equilibrium of G(X 
1 ×X1
2).
This implies that {x 
1} is also a proﬁtable deviation for player 1 in Γ(G). We now show
that the existence of such a deviation in Γ(G) contradicts the fact that s∗ is a subgame
perfect equilibrium of ΓT(G). To see this, consider the strategy s 
1 in which player 1
plays {x 
1} in the ﬁrst period of ΓT(G) and play according to s∗
1 at any other history.
Consider the subgame starting after this deviation by player 1. We then have the game
ΓT−1(G({x 
1}×X1
2)). Clearly, in any result of this subgame player 1, plays x 
1. Therefore,




1); hence, the proﬁle of strategies (s 
1,s ∗
2)





1)). It follows that s 
1 is a proﬁtable
deviation for player 1 given the strategy s∗
2 of player 2, which implies that (s∗
1,s ∗
2) cannot be
an equilibrium of ΓT(G), a contradiction. We conclude that x∗ must also be implementable
in Γ(G).
C Proofs related to the geometry
Proof of Proposition 6. Let x∗ be an implementable proﬁle of actions with x∗
j =
BRj(x∗
i), and x∗ interior. By contradiction, suppose that the slope of indiﬀerence curve
of player i at x∗ is negative while the slope of BRj at x∗ is positive.
Deﬁne Q+ := {y ∈ [0,1]2 : y ≥ x∗} and Q− = {y ∈ [0,1]2 : y ≤ x∗}.26 Since the
indiﬀerence curve of player i at x∗ is negatively sloped, there exists an ε>0 such that
either ui(y) >u i(x∗) for all y ∈B ε(x∗) ∩ (Q+ \{ x∗}) or such that ui(y) >u i(x∗) for all
y ∈B ε(x∗) ∩ (Q− \{ x∗}), where Bε(x∗) is an open ball of radius ε around x∗.
26Let x and y two vectors in Rn.W ew r i t ex ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈{ 1,...,n}
34Let f : X → Y be a function. We denote Grf the graph of f. Since the slope of BRj

























∗) ∩ Q− \{ x
∗}),
are non-empty sets, hence the graph of player j’s restricted best-reply intersects player
i’s strict upper contour set at x∗.
Finally, from Theorem 1, the two simple commitments that could possibly imple-




i),1]). It follows from the
above arguments that x∗ cannot be a solution of the optimization program described in
Proposition 5 (since the graph of player j’s restricted best-reply intersects player i’s strict
upper contour set at x∗), hence a contradiction with x∗ being implementable. The same
argument follows mutatis mutandum for the other cases.
Lemma A3 Let G be a game with strategic complementarities and positive consonance
i.e., ui is non-decreasing in xj, j  = i, for all i ∈ N. We have li ≥ x∗
i(K).
Proof. Suppose that x∗
i(k +1 )>l i >x ∗
i(k). Since, BRj is non-decreasing, we have
BRj(x∗




i(k +1 ) )≥ ui(li,BR j(li)) (A3)
since ui has positive consonance. Moreover, since x∗
i(k + 1) is the unique best-reply to
x∗
j(k +1 )=BRj(x∗
i(k +1 ) )( x∗(k + 1) is a Nash equilibrium), we have
ui(x
∗
i(k +1 ) ,x
∗
j(k +1 ) )>u i(li,BR j(x
∗
i(k +1 ) )
≥ ui(li,BR j(li)) ≥ ui(x
∗
i(k +1 ) ,x
∗
j(k +1 ) ) ,
(A4)
a contradiction. A similar argument shows that li could not be smaller than x∗
i(1). 
Proof of Proposition 7. We ﬁrst start with a preliminary observation. The best-reply
of player i separates the action space [0,1]2 into two regions: one region in which player i’s
35indiﬀerence curves are negatively sloped, one region in which player i’s indiﬀerence curves
are positively sloped. To prove this result, ﬁx an action x∗
j of player j, and consider the
best-reply x∗
i = BRi(x∗
j)o fp l a y e ri to x∗
j. Deﬁne IC := {x ∈ [0,1]2 : ui(x)=ui(x∗)}.
For any xi  = x∗
i,w eh a v eui(xi,x ∗
j) <u i(x∗)s i n c ex∗
i is the unique best-reply to x∗
j.N e x t ,
if xj <x ∗
j, it follows from ui increasing in xj that ui(xi,x j) ≤ ui(xi,x ∗
j) <u i(x∗), hence
(xi,x j) / ∈ IC. Therefore, for any xi, we need xj >x ∗
j for (xi,x j)t ob e l o n gt oIC. Hence,
we have that for any xi <x ∗
i, IC is negatively sloped and for any xi >x ∗
i, IC is positively
sloped.
As a second observation, note that for any xi ∈ [x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k +1 ) ] ,BRi(BRj(xi)) − xi
is either positive or negative, but does not alternate in signs. For otherwise, there exists
another equilibrium in (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k+1)), a contradiction with the deﬁnition of the x∗(k)’s.
Moreover, we have that BRi(BRj(xi))−xi < 0 for any xi ∈ (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k+1))ifk is odd,
BRi(BRj(xi)) − xi > 0, if k is even. In words, the graph of player i’s best-reply is
to the ‘left’ of the graph of player j’s best-reply if k is odd, and to the ‘right’ if k is
even. (See Figure 5.) Furthermore, BRi(BRj(xi)) − xi > 0 for any xi <x ∗
i(1) and
BRi(BRj(xi)) − xi < 0 for any xi >x ∗
i(K).27
Fix a proﬁle of actions x with xj = BRj(xi)a n dxi ∈ (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k+1))forsomek even.
We want to show that this proﬁle is not implementable. From the previous observation,
we have that BRi(xj)=BRi(BRj(xi)) >x i. From the ﬁrst observation, it then follows
that the indiﬀerence curve of player i at x is negatively sloped. Since BRj is positively
sloped, it follows from Proposition 6 that x is not implementable. A similar argument
holds for any x with xj = BRj(xi)a n dxi <x ∗
i(1).






1)) for some k odd. We want to show that any such a proﬁle is implementable by the
simple bilateral commitment ({x∗
i},[0,BR j(x∗
i)]). The key observation is that the best-
reply of player i is now to the ‘left’ of the best-reply of player j i.e., BRi(BRj(x∗
i)) <x ∗
i.















i)) by strict quasi-concavity of
ui. Finally, note that br
X∗
j
j (xi)=BRj(xi) for any xi ≤ x∗
i, henceforth the maximum of
27By contradiction, suppose that BRi(BRj(xi)) − xi < 0 for any xi <x i(1). In particular, for xi =0 ,




j (·)) is achieved in x∗
i by strict quasi-concavity of ui(·,BR j(·)). It follows that x∗
is implementable (step 4).





i(K),l i] is implementable by the simple bilateral commitment ({x∗
i},[0,BR j(x∗
i)]).
D Proofs related to the welfare
Proof of Theorem 3. Let (X∗,x ∗) be any equilibrium outcome of Γ(G) such that
X∗ is simple, and x∗ is interior. Let T be a set of parameters and deﬁne the family of
payoﬀ functions : ui : X × T → R, for all i ∈{ 1,2}. We want to show that for a dense
open subset T ∗ of T, x∗ is ineﬃcient. If x∗ is an equilibrium of the mother game G,t h e
result follows from Theorem 1 of Dubey (1986). If x∗ is not an equilibrium of the mother
game G, the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 of Dubey. The proof is as follows.

















and let Dt(·) be the restriction of D to t.T h u s ,Dt(x∗) is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at
x∗. A key step in Dubey’s proof is to observe that at any interior equilibrium x∗ of G,t h e
diagonal elements of the Jacobian matrix are zero, and that the set of 2×2 matrices with
zeros on the diagonal is a sub-manifold of R4 of co-dimension 2. If x∗ is not an equilibrium
of G, we have a similar result, that is, we can show that if x∗ is an equilibrium result of
Γ, then Dt(x∗) ∈ A∩B,w i t hA∩B a sub-manifold of R4 of co-dimension 2. This step is
the only step that diﬀers with Dubey’s proof.
First, from Lemma 2, for at least one player, we have x∗
i = BRi(xj). Without loss of
generality, suppose that x∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1). Since x∗ is interior, we then have that
∂u2
∂x2(x∗)=0 .
This equality is our ﬁrst constraint on the Jacobian matrix. Formally, deﬁne the set
A = {M ∈ R
4 : M22 =0 }, (A6)
i.e., the set of 2 × 2 matrices with a zero on the diagonal. Observe that if x∗ is an
equilibrium result, then Dt(x∗) ∈ A,o rx∗ ∈ D
−1
t (A). The set A is a sub-manifold of R4
of co-dimension 1.









2 (x1)) for all x1 ∈ Y1. We show that these inequalities
impose a relationship between the ﬁrst-order derivatives of u1 with respect to x1 and
x2, respectively. If br
X∗
j
2 is diﬀerentiable at x∗, then the relationship is trivial. However,
whenever X∗ is a simple commitment, br
X∗
2
2 is not diﬀerentiable in x∗
1.W eu s et h ec o n c e p t s
of subgradient and subdiﬀerential to circumvent this problem.28
For any function f : Z → R,d e n o t e∂f(z) the subdiﬀerential of f at z. We refer
the reader to Clarke (1989, Chapter 1) or Rockafellar (1981, Chapter 3) for rigorous
deﬁnitions of subdiﬀerentials. As an example, if f(z)=|z|,t h e n∂f(0) = [−1,1].
Since u2 is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, BR2 is continuously diﬀerentiable, hence
Lipschitz continuous. From Lemma 1, it then follows that br
X∗
2
2 is Lipschitz continuous.
Note that Rademacher Theorem implies that br
X∗
2
2 is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
Let us consider the subdiﬀential of v1(·): =−u1(·,br
X∗
2
2 (·)) at x∗























1 minimizes v1,0∈ ∂v1(x∗















the required relationship. (Note that if br
X∗
2
2 is diﬀerentiable at x∗




2 evaluated at x∗
1.)
For any scalar a, deﬁne the set
B = {M ∈ R
4 : M11 + aM12 =0 }, (A9)
i.e., the set of 2 × 2 matrices with a linear relationship between the two ﬁrst entries. It
follows that if x∗ is an equilibrium result, then Dt(x∗) ∈ B,o rx∗ ∈ D
−1
t (B) (take a = ξ).
The set B is a submanifold of R4 of co-dimension 1. It then trivially follows that A ∩ B
is a submanifold of R4 of co-dimension 2, as required.
28We refer the reader to Rockafellar (1981) for a good source on the theory of subgradients and non-
smooth optimization.
38Finally, deﬁne the set
C = {M ∈ R
4 :t h er o w so fM are linearly dependent}. (A10)
It is easy to see that if x∗ is eﬃcient, then Dt(x∗) ∈ C,o rx∗ ∈ D
−1
t (C). For otherwise,
there exists a neighborhood O of x∗ and a x  ∈ O such that ui(x )=ui(x∗)+εi, εi > 0,



























Hence, if a proﬁle x∗ is an equilibrium result and eﬃcient, then Dt(x∗) ∈ A ∩ B ∩ C
or x∗ ∈ D
−1
t (A ∩ B ∩ C).
The next step is to show that for a dense open set T ∗ ⊂ T, D
−1
t (A∩B ∩C)i se m p t y .
To do so, we shall show that the co-dimension of D
−1
t (A∩B∩C) is 2, that is the dimension
of Y , hence is empty. This step is found in Dubey’s proof.
Ineﬃciency and a non-smooth game
Assume that the game G is a game with strategic complementarities and negative
consonance i.e., xj  → ui(xi,x j) is decreasing in xj for each player i ∈ N, i  = j.N o t et h a t
G is not assumed to be smooth.
The ﬁrst observation is that BR1(BR2(x∗
1)) ≤ x∗
1.S i n c eBR2 is monotone increasing in
x1,w eh a v ebr
[0,BR2(x∗
1)]






otherwise. Henceforth, if BR1(BR2(x∗
1)) >x ∗
1, we have that player 2’s best-reply to
BR1(BR2(x∗
1)) is BR2(x∗
1), hence a contradiction with x∗
1 maximizing player 1’s payoﬀ on
the constrained best-reply of player 2.












2) improves upon 2’s payoﬀ.
Finally, since at an equilibrium x∗ of Γ, x∗
2 = BR2(x∗







with a strict inequality if x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium of G.
39It follows that (BR1(x∗
2),x ∗
2) Pareto-improves upon x∗, hence x∗ is not eﬃcient. Fi-
nally, observe that the result also holds if we assume strategic substitutes and payoﬀ
increasing in the action of the opponent.
Proof of Theorem 4 Let (X∗,x ∗) be an equilibrium outcome of Γ and assume that x∗
is an improvement upon the status quo. Let xN be a Nash equilibrium, which is eﬃcient
in the set of Nash equilibria, for which we have ui(x∗) ≥ ui(xN)f o ri ∈{ 1,2} with at least
one strict inequality. Using Proposition 2, we can assume that x∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1). By our
assumption that neither of the lead-follow equilibria is an improvement upon the status
quo, we have that
u2(x
∗) ≥ u2(x
N) >u 2(l1,BR 2(l1)).
Observe that in all the three proﬁles, player 2 is best replying to player 1’s action.
Furthermore, as player 2’s payoﬀ function is monotonic in his opponent’s action, we have
that u∗
2(x1): =u2(x1,BR 2(x1)) is a monotonic function of x1, hence x∗
1 and l1 must lie on
two diﬀerent sides of xN
1 i.e., we must have either l1 ≥ xN
1 ≥ x∗
1 or l1 ≤ xN
1 ≤ x∗
1.S i n c e
best-reply maps are single valued, we also have that l1  = xN
1  = x∗
1.
Moreover, since xN and (l1,BR 2(l1)) both lie on the graph of player 2’s mother best-
reply and u1 is continuous, we have
u1(l1,BR 2(l1)) ≥ u1(x
∗) ≥ u1(x
N).
Assume that player 2’s best-reply function is monotonic. We will show that l1 and x∗
1
cannot lie on two diﬀerent sides of xN
1 , and give to player 1 a payoﬀ higher than his
Nash payoﬀ whenever player 1’s payoﬀ function is monotonic in his opponent’s action
and best-reply functions are monotonic.
We ﬁrst start with the case in which the best-reply function BR2 is non-decreasing
and the player 1’s payoﬀ function has positive consonance i.e., x2  → u1(x1,x 2)i sn o n -
decreasing. From Lemma A3, we have l1 >x N
1 , therefore l1 >x N
1 >x ∗
1 since l1 and x∗
1
must lie on two diﬀerent sides of xN
1 .M o r e o v e r , BR2(xN
1 ) ≥ BR2(x∗















40where the ﬁrst strict inequality follows by strict quasi-concavity and the second by positive
consonance, a contradiction.
Second, consider the case in which the best-reply function BR2 is non-decreasing
and the player 1’s payoﬀ function has negative consonance i.e., x2  → u1(x1,x 2)i sn o n -
increasing. An immediate modiﬁcation of Lemma A3 implies that l1 <x N
1 , and therefore
l1 <x N
1 <x ∗
1. It follows that BR2(xN















where the ﬁrst strict inequality follows by strict quasi-concavity and the second by negative
consonance, a contradiction.
The other cases are similar and left to the reader.
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